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BANKRUPTCY-The Recoupment Doctrine:
Ashland Petroleum Company v. Appel
I. INTRODUCTION
In Ashland Petroleum Co. v. Appel (In re B&L Oil Co.),' the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that a creditor had
properly "recouped" prepetition overpayments made to a debtor by with-
holding money for purchases made after the debtor filed a petition in
bankruptcy.2 This case is one in a series3 that has allowed a creditor to
improve its status through judicial application of the recoupment doctrine.
Recoupment is a very limited exception to the general rule that all un-
secured creditors of a bankrupt debtor stand on equal footing for satis-
faction.4
This Note will examine the court's rationale in Ashland and will dem-
onstrate that the court improperly applied the recoupment doctrine. The
court's reliance on bankruptcy cases in which recoupment was allowed
is too tenuous to grant preferential treatment to an unsecured creditor,
and the court's equitable concerns are unfounded.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
B&L Oil Company (B&L) and Ashland Petroleum Company (Ashland)
entered into an oil division contract5 that gave Ashland the right to pur-
L. 782 F.2d 155 (10th Cir. 1986). B&L Oil Co. is the debtor, and Garry Appel is the trustee for
the debtor.
2. Id. at 156-57.
3. See, e.g., American Central Airlines, Inc., v. Dept. of Transportation (In re American Central
Airlines, Inc.), 60 B.R. 587 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986); Rakozy v. Reiman Construction (In re
Clowards, Inc.), 42 B.R. 627 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1984); United States v. Midwest Service and Supply
Co., Inc. (In re Midwest Service and Supply Co., Inc.), 44 B.R. 262 (Bankr. D.C. Utah 1983);
Sapir v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Greater New York (In re Yonkers Hamilton Sanitarium, Inc.),
34 B.R. 385 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1983); Waldschmidt v. CBS, Inc., 14 B.R. 309 (M.D. Tenn. 1981).
4. E.g., Joint Industry Board of the Electrical Industry v. United States, 391 U.S. 224, 228
(1968); 4 Collier on Bankruptcy, § 547.03 (15th ed. 1986).
5. A division order is a contract of sale to the purchaser of oil or gas. 8 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL
AND GAS LAw 233 (1984). The order directs the purchaser to make payment for the value of the
products taken in proportions set out in the division order. id.
Even though the lessee by the terms of the lease has authority to dispose of any
products produced, the purchaser usually requests the operator to furnish complete
abstracts of title which the purchaser causes to be examined, after which a division
order is prepared by the purchaser on the basis of the ownership shown in the title
opinion prepared after examination of the abstracts. The purchaser usually requires
that the division order be executed by the operator, the royalty owners and other
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chase unspecified amounts of crude oil produced by B&L.' During August
1982, Ashland overpaid B&L on two occasions.7 In September 1982,
B&L filed a petition under Chapter 11. Ashland then withheld payments
for subsequent deliveries in order to recover its overpayments.9
Ashland brought an action in the bankruptcy court asking for a dec-
laration both that it had properly "recouped" its overpayment and that it
could recoup the remaining balance from future purchases.'" The bank-
ruptcy court held that recoupment was improper because the debts did
not arise from the same transaction, " and the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado affirmed. i2 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the recoupment doctrine ap-
plied. 3
III. BACKGROUND OF THE RECOUPMENT CONCEPT
A. Distinctions Between Setoff and Recoupment
Setoff and recoupment are limited exceptions to the general bankruptcy
rule of equal distribution of the debtor's assets among creditors. 4 This
section will distinguish these doctrines from one another. Both are often
invoked by unsecured creditors for the purpose of receiving preferential
treatment 15 over other unsecured creditors in a bankruptcy. If the statutory
doctrine of setoff6 is not applicable,' 7 a court may apply the judicially
created doctrine of recoupment 8 to reach essentially the same result.'
persons having an interest in the production. When the division order is executed
and returned to the purchaser, payment is commenced for the products removed.
The division order is typically terminable at the will of either party.
6. Ashland, 782 F.2d at 156. The oil division order gave Ashland the right to buy "all or any
part" of the oil produced by B&L until B&L terminated the order by giving thirty days notice. Id.
7. Id. On August 2, 1982 and August 16, 1982, Ashland overpaid B&L for oil produced and
delivered in June of 1982 by $90,721.30. Id.
8. Id. II U.S.C. §301 (1978).
9. Ashland, 782 F.2d at 156. Ashland withheld $81,569.05 from payments owed to B&L.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 159.
14. See supra note 4.
15. The Bankruptcy Code generally prohibits preferential treatment if it involves a "preference."
I1 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1978). A preference is a prepetition transfer that allows a creditor to receive
more than he would get in liquidation. Id. The elements of a preference as set out in § 547(b) are:
1) a transfer of the debtor's property 2) to a creditor 3) for an antecedent debt 4) made within 90
days of the petition 5) while the debtor is insolvent 6) which depletes the estate. Id. The debtor is
presumed insolvent on and during the 90 days immediately preceding the date of the filing of the
petition. II U.S.C. § 547(f) (1978).
16. 11 U.S.C. §553 (1978).
17. Creditors will first attempt to use setoff because courts are more willing to apply a doctrine
when the requirements are set out statutorily. If a creditor cannot meet the requirements of setoff,
he will resort to the recoupment doctrine.
18. Waldschmidt v. CBS, Inc., 14 B.R. 309 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1981); see In re Monongahela
Rye Liquors, Inc., 141 F.2d 864 (3d Cir. 1944).
19. The result is that the creditor will receive a preference. See supra note 12.
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Each doctrine, however, has specific requirements that must be met before
the court will allow their use by a creditor. The doctrine of setoff developed
in a nonbankruptcy context as a practical tool to eliminate unnecessary
litigation between parties holding mutual debts. E° In a broad sense, setoff
is the discharge or reduction of one demand by an opposite one, or a
right one party has to use his claim in full or partial satisfaction of what
he owes.2 Setoff is based on the principle that justice and equity require
that the demands of parties mutually indebted be set off against each
other, and only the balance recovered. 2 According to the Third Circuit,
"[t]he historical antecedents of setoff rights are long and venerable and
are based on the common sense notion that 'a man should not be compelled
to pay one moment what he will be entitled to recover back the next.' "23
Setoff in bankruptcy is rooted in equity. 4 A creditor's right of setoff
in bankruptcy is explicitly set forth in Section 553(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code.' The three elements necessary to establish a creditor's setoff rights
are:
1) a debt 6 owing by the creditor to the debtor which arose before
commencement of the case;
2 7
2) a claim of the creditor against the debtor which also arose before
commencement of the case;28 and
3) the debt and claim must be mutual obligations.29
Elements one and two restrict a creditor's right to set off a debt against
an amount owed to the debtor, and apply to situations where both the
debt and the claim arose prior to the bankruptcy filing. 0 The third element,
mutuality of obligation, requires that the creditor is indebted to the debtor
20. Thus, the Supreme Court has stated that setoff "is grounded on the absurdity of making A
pay B when B owes A." Studley v. Boylston National Bank, 229 U.S. 523, 528 (1913).
21. 20 AM. JUR. 2D Counterclaim, Recoupment and Setoff § 2 (1965).
22. Id. at §7.
23. United States v. Norton, 717 F.2d 767, 773 (3d. Cir. 1983).
24. In re Braniff Airways, 42 B.R. 443, 448 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1984).
25. II U.S.C § 553(a) (1982) provides in pertinent part:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section and in sections 362 and 363
of this title, this title does not affect any right of a creditor to offset a mutual debt
owing by such creditor to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the
case under this title against a claim of such creditor against the debtor that arose
before the commencement of the case, except to the extent that...
26. A "debt" is a liability on a "claim." I I U.S.C. § 101(l 1) (1978). "Claim" is very broadly
defined in the Bankruptcy Code and means in part, "right to payment, whether or not such fight is
reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed,
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured. Id. at § 101(4)(A).
27. The filing of the bankruptcy petition fixes "the line of cleavage with reference to the condition
of the bankrupt estate." Only debts or credits existing at the time of filing can be setoff against the
other, and transactions occurring later cannot be taken into account. In re Howell, 4 B.R. 102, 108
(Bankr. M. D. Tenn. 1980).
28. Id. at 108. See also Stair v. Hamilton Bank of Morristown (In re Morristown Lincoln-Mercury,
Inc.), 42 B.R. 413, 417 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984).
29. See, e.g., Waldschmidt v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co. (In re Fulghum Const. Corp.),
23 B.R. 147, 151 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982).
30. E.g., Whitman v. Seedtec International (In re Whitman), 38 B.R. 395 (Bankr. N.D. 1984).
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who likewise owes a debt to the creditor;3' the claims must be owing
between the same parties, in the same right or capacity, and must be of
the same kind or quality.32
The requirement of mutuality of parties is of particular significance in
the context of bankruptcy.33 By definition, a "debtor-in-possession" is
the debtor when no trustee is serving in the Chapter 11 case.34 Because
the debtor and the debtor-in-possession are separate and distinct entities,35
the courts have concluded that the requisite element of mutuality of parties
is lacking whenever a creditor attempts to offset a prepetition debt against
a post-petition claim.36 A debtor's prepetition claim against a creditor
does not involve the same parties as the debtor-in-possession's claim
against the same creditor.37 The automatic stay prevents prepetition ob-
ligations from being off-set against post-petition obligations.38 Setoff ef-
fectively elevates an unsecured claim to secured status, to the extent that
the debtor has a mutual, prepetition claim against the creditor."9
Recoupment, unlike setoff, does not involve the concept of mutuality
of obligations.' The claim must arise out of the same rather than a
different transaction.4' The recoupment doctrine is essentially a defense
to the debtor's claim against the creditor rather than a mutual obligation.42
A recoupment claim may be asserted independently of section 553,43 and
the statutory limitations on setoff in bankruptcy are not applied to re-
coupment.44 A recoupment allows the creditor to assert that certain mutual
claims extinguish one another in bankruptcy, in spite of the fact that they
could not be "setoff" under 11 U.S.C. section 553.5
31. See Stair v. Hamilton Bank of Morristown (In re Morristown Lincoln-Mercury, Inc.), 42
B.R. 413 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984).
32. See In re Braniff Airways, 42 B.R. 443, 449 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1984).
33. See American Central Airlines, Inc., 60 B.R. at 590.
34. 11 U.S.C. § i101 ( 1) (1978). The Code in general is drafted in terms of the powers and duties
of the trustee as the representative of the estate. In Chapter 11, a trustee is appointed only when
one is needed. Id. at § 1104(a). Normally the debtor, now the debtor-in-possession, remains as the
estate's representative, in which event the debtor-in-possession has the powers and duties conferred
by the various Code provisions on a trustee. Id. at § 1107(a).
35. Hill v. Farmers Home Administration (In re Hill), 19 B.R. 375, 380 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1982).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. In re Midwest Service and Supply Co., Inc., 44 B.R. 262, 265 (Bankr. D. Utah 1983).
39. I1 U.S.C. § 5 06(a) (1978). (The claim of a creditor that is subject to setoff under Section
553 is a secured claim to the extent of the amount subject to setoff.) Id.
40. In re American Central Airlines, Inc., 60 B.R. at 590.
41. Sapir v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Greater New York (In re Yonkers Hamilton Sanitarium,
Inc.), 34 B.R. 385, 386 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1983).
42. In re Monongahela Rye Liquors, Inc., 141 F.2d 864, 869 (3d. Cir. 1944).
43. Rakozy v. Reiman Construction (In re Clowards, Inc.), 42 B.R. 627 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1984)
(citing Quittner v. Los Angeles Steel Casting Co., 202 F2d 814, 816 n.3 (9th Cir. 1953)).
44. Accord Lee v. Schweiker, 739 F.2d 870, 875 (3d Cir. 1984).
45. Id.
[Vol. 17
BANKRUPTCY
Because the doctrines of setoff and recoupment are exceptions to the
rule that bankruptcy operates as a "cleavage" in time,' they should be
narrowly construed. A creditor's right to setoff is statutorily restricted by
the Bankruptcy Code.47 The recoupment doctrine in contrast is judicially
fashioned. 8 While setoff under the Bankruptcy Act is limited to instances
involving mutuality of obligations, recoupment is subject to no such
limitation.49 The only real requirement regarding recoupment is that the
sum owed can be reduced only by matters or claims arising out of the
same transaction as the original sum.'
B. Application of the Recoupment Doctrine to Executory Contracts
"Executory contract"51 is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, but the
legislative history indicates that Congress intended the term be defined
as a contract "on which performance remains due to some extent on both
sides." 52 Recoupment therefore is applied when a claim and counterclaim
arise out of the same contract. 53 When the debtor is party to an executory
contract when the bankruptcy petition is filed, a debtor-in-possession may
not assume the favorable aspects of a contract (post-petition performance)
and reject the unfavorable aspects of the same contract (the obligation to
repay prepetition overpayments by means of "recoupment").
46. Ashland, 782 F.2d at 159.
47. 11 U.S.C. §553 (1978).
48. Lee v. Schweiker, 739 F.2d 870, 875 (3d. Cir. 1984). Social security benefits recipient, who
filed a Chapter 13 case, instituted proceeding to recover amounts which the Social Security Admin-
istration had withheld from her checks before and after she filed bankruptcy to recover prior over-
payments. Id. at 872. The Court of Appeals held that the SSA could not recoup overpayments made
to a recipient after the recipient had filed a petition in bankruptcy. Id. at 876.
49. See Waldschmidt, 14 B.R. at 314.
50. Id.
5 I. An executory contract is one that has not as yet been fully completed or performed, in contrast
to an executed contract in which everything that was to be done is done. 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contracts
§ 6 (1964). If a transaction is fully executed on both sides, it is not properly described as a contract.
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 3d § 14 (1957). All contracts to a greater or less extent are executory. Id.
52. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 58, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5787, 5844; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 347, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5963, 6303.
This definition is similar to the one formulated by Professor Countryman in his seminal article
on the topic. Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy; Part I, 57 MINN. L. REv. 439, 460
(1973). According to Countryman, an executory contract for purposes of the bankruptcy statutes is
"a contract under which the obligations of both the bankrupt and the other party are so far unperformed
that failure to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the performance
of the other. " Id.
53. See American Central Airlines, Inc., 60 B.R. at 590.
54. See Lee, 739 F.2d at 876; In re Yonkers Hamilton Sanitarium, Inc., 34 B.R. at 388. For
example, in In re Yonkers Hamilton Sanitarium, the Sanitarium agreed not to charge Medicare
beneficiaries directly but instead to bill the Government to receive payment for services provided.
Id. The agreement further allowed the Government to reclaim any overpayments to the hospital from
current or future payments. After the Sanitarium declared bankruptcy, it continued to receive payments
from the Government (post-petition performance) but was also obligated to allow the Government
to recoup any prepetition overpayments (prepetition obligation).
Spring 19871
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A. Discussion of the Ashland Court's Rationale
In the present case, Ashland withheld money owed to B&L for oil
deliveries made after B&L had filed a petition in bankruptcy.55 Ashland
apparently recognized that setoff would not be available because its claim
was prepetition and its debt was post-petition.56 Ashland thus claimed
that it had "properly" recouped its prepetition overpayment. 7
One policy of the Bankruptcy Code is that unsecured creditors stand
on equal footing.58 Historically, since the doctrine of recoupment is an
exception to the equal treatment policy, courts have allowed recoupment
only in very narrow circumstances.5 9 Allowing Ashland to recoup its
prepetition overpayments directly conflicts with the policies underlying
the Bankruptcy Code.
The Ashland court admitted that recoupment, like setoff, is an exception
to the general rule that unsecured creditors be treated equally.' The court
also conceded that setoff is allowed only in very narrow circumstances, 6'
but refused to limit recoupment in the same way.62 Instead, the court
allowed Ashland to recoup,63 significantly expanding the doctrine.
As support for its holding, the court looked to "analogous" bankruptcy
cases that had allowed recoupment.64 The court makes no attempt to
explain why these cases are analogous to the instant case; it simply briefly
55. Ashland, 782 F.2d at 156.
56. Before Ashland could exercise its right to a setoff, it must seek relief from the automatic
stay. I I U.S.C. § 362, 362(a), 553. Had Ashland filed such a claim, the debtor-in-possession could
have successfully defeated it because Ashland did not request relief from the automatic stay, nor did
it meet the conditions of § 553. Id. The mutuality requirement of § 553(a)(3) would not be met
because debts and claims must both be prepetition. I I U.S.C. § 553. Ashland's claim was prepetition,
but its debt to B&L was post-petition. See supra Section liA of text.
57. Ashland, 782 F.2d at 156.
58. See supra note 4.
59. California Canners and Growers v. Military Distributors of Virginia, Inc. (In re California
Canners and Growers), 62 B.R. 18, 19 (9th Cir. BAP 1986).
60. Ashland, 782 F.2d at 157.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 159.
63. Id.
64. The cases cited were: Waldschmidt v. CBS, Inc., 14 B.R. 309 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1981)
(recording company was allowed to recoup advance royalties paid to a musician, rather than being
required to claim as an unsecured creditor for the outstanding overpayment total at the time of the
bankruptcy filing); United States v. Midwest Service and Supply Company, Inc. (In re Midwest
Service and Supply Co., Inc.), 44 B.R. 262 (Bankr. D. Utah 1983) (recoupment allowed when
progress payments on repair or construction contracts were made in excess of the value of the work
performed before bankruptcy); Sapir, 34 B.R. 385 (recoupment doctrine applied to allow the gov-
ernment to recover Medicare overpayments from post-bankruptcy reimbursements to a hospital that
continued to operate after filing a Chapter I I petition); In re Clowards, Inc., 42 B.R. 627 (Bankr.
D. Idaho 1984) (application of the recoupment doctrine to permit a claim for damages for alleged
breach of a construction contract to reduce the balance due under the contract). Each of the above
cases involved an executory contract.
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describes four cases in which recoupment was allowed.65 The court then
immediately cites two cases' in which recoupment was not permitted.67
The Ashland court focused on the factors the Lee v. Schweiker court
used to distinguish cases in which recoupment was allowed.68 According
to the Ashland court, the Lee court asserted that most recoupment cases
involved single contracts that provided for advance estimated payments,
subject to later corrections.69 However, the court in Lee never used the
term "single contract." Evidently, the Ashland court was attempting to
make a distinction between a "single contract" and a "series of separate
contracts." 7 0 The Ashland court concluded that the oil division order was
a single contract,7" basing this conclusion on non-bankruptcy cases in
which state courts characterized a division order for oil or gas as one
contract between the sellers and the purchasers. 72 According to Lee, the
analysis of recoupment cases was based on the treatment of executory
contracts in bankruptcy; 73 a debtor who assumes the favorable aspects of
the contract (post-petition payment) must also take the unfavorable aspects.
of the same contract (obligation to repay prepetition overpayments). 74
The Ashland court applied this reasoning to the oil division order, 75 but
never explicitly described the contract between Ashland and B&L as
executory.
Finally, the court questioned whether the month-to-month purchases
of oil arose out of the same transaction, for purposes of applying the
recoupment doctrine,76 but the court never expressly resolved this issue.
Instead, the court conceded that the overpayments and the post-bankruptcy
purchases of oil involved were not as closely related as the events in
prior cases in which recoupment was allowed.77 In fact, the court stated
"the obligations are easily separable and independently determinable,""
65. Ashland, 782 F.2d at 157-58.
66. Lee v. Schweiker, 739 F 2d 870 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Hagan, 41 B.R. 122 (Bankr. D. R. I.
1984).
67. Ashland, 782 F.2d at 157.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Ashland contended that the district court had erred in finding that a division order constitutes
a series of separate contracts. Id. at 156.
71. The implication is that if the division order is a single contract as opposed to a series of
separate contracts, it is an executory contract. See supra note 5.
72. See Maddox v. Gulf Oil Corporation, 222 Kan. 733, 567 P.2d 1326, 1328 (1977), cerl.
denied, 434 U.S. 1065 (1978).
73. See supra Section IIIB of text.
74. Lee, 739 F.2d at 876.
75. Ashland, 782 F.2d at 159.
76. See Waldschmidt, 14 B.R. at 314. ("The only real requirement regarding recoupment is that
a sum can be reduced only by matters or claims arising out of the same transaction as the original
sum.") Id.
77. Ashland, 782 F.2d at 158.
78. Id.
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implying that these month-to-month purchases between Ashland and B&L
did not involve the same transaction.
Nevertheless, the court reasoned that the present situation was suffi-
ciently analogous to other bankruptcy cases in which recoupment was
allowed.79 Although the court stated that any recoupment exception 'per-
haps' should be narrowly construed," it applied the doctrine in the instant
case. 81
B. Analysis of the Court's Rationale
The Ashland court's analogy to cases where recoupment was permitted
is tenuous for several reasons. First, it is debatable whether the contract
between Ashland and B&L was an executory contract. The contract bound
B&L to permit Ashland to take all or any part of the oil from the lease
until B&L terminated the order by giving thirty days written notice.8 2
Had B&L terminated the agreement, the amount owed Ashland would
have been discharged in the subsequent bankruptcy,83 because there would
have been no further performance necessary. Further, a finding that the
transaction between Ashland and B&L was an executory contract does
not automatically allow application of the recoupment doctrine.
In a similar case, California Canners and Growers v. Military Dis-
tributors of Virginia, Inc.," decided after Ashland, the United States
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit held that recoupment
would not be appropriate where one transaction occurred prepetition and
the other post-petition." In the concurring opinion of California Canners
79. Specifically, the court cited In re Yonkers Hamilton Sanitarium, Inc., 34 B.R. 385, 388
(Bankr. S. D. N. Y. 1983), in which Medicare overpaid a hospital and the court allowed Medicare
to "recoup" against payments owed the hospital for patients it treated after filing Chapter II
bankruptcy proceedings. Id.
80. Ashland. 782 F.2d at 158.
81. Id. at 159.
82. Id. at 158.
83. See Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland, 63 B.R. 18 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1986).
84. In re California Canners and Growers, 62 B.R. 18 (9th Cir. BAP 1986). California Canners
sold and delivered goods to Military Distributors which subsequently, upon the order of Calif.
Canners, shipped goods to various military installations. Id. at 19. Military Distributors billed Calif.
Canners for the goods it delivered and Calif. Canners in turn billed the government. Id. Calif.
Canners received payment from the government but did not pay Military Distributors for several
orders and shipments before Calif. Canners filed a Chapter II petition in bankruptcy. Id.
After bankruptcy, Calif. Canners made several shipments in connection with orders placed by
Military Distributors. Id. Military Distributors admitted that it owed Calif. Canners $86,842.47 for
goods delivered to it by Calif. Canners after the Chapter I I filing. Id. Military Distributors contended
that it was entitled to a setoff or credit of $68,810.52 for prepetition debts owed to them by Calif.
Canners. Id.
The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel held that although the claims arose under the same distributors
agreement, the recoupment doctrine would not allow the creditor (Military Distributors) to offset its
prepetition claim against its post-petition obligation to the debtor (Calif. Canners). Id. at 20-21.
85. Id. at 21.
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and Growers, Bankruptcy Judge Elliot disagreed with the majority's
executory contract analogy to the extent that it holds the debtor's con-
tinuance of a business relationship with the creditor justifies statutory,
contractual, or common law recoupment of prepetition contract claims.8 6
The Bankruptcy Code requires full satisfaction of valid prepetition claims
for defaults by the debtor when the contract is assumed.87 Judge Elliot
found no congressional authorization for preferential treatment of a con-
tracting party's prepetition claims in absence of court approved assump-
tion of the contract."8 Another deficiency in the executory contract analogy,
according to Judge Elliot, is that recoupment is not limited to contractual
transactions, executory or otherwise."
Second, the contract itself did not provide for recoupment. The Ashland
court recognized that in most of the situations "in which the recoupment
doctrine was applied, the contract at issue expressly permitted the with-
holding of overpayments from future payments. ' 9" Yet the court still
considered the situation in Ashland sufficiently analogous to other bank-
ruptcy cases to warrant recoupment.9 1 The court stated that the overpay-
ments under the division order were much like advance royalties to a
writer or musician.92 "They are similar to the medicare overpayments to
a hospital, which a court allowed to be 'recouped' against payments owed
the hospital for patients it treated after filing Chapter 11 bankruptcy
proceedings. " 93 However, in each of these situations, the contracts ex-
pressly provided for repayment of advances or overpayments.94
Third, and most questionable, is the Ashland court's conclusion that
the month-to-month oil purchases arose out of the same transaction."
The court admitted that the overpayments and the post-bankruptcy pur-
chases of oil were not closely intertwined events.' The fact that the same
two parties were involved, and that a similar subject matter gave rise to
both claims does not mean that the two arose from the "same transac-
tion. -9'
In the instant case, Ashland mistakenly overpaid B&L for oil produced
86. Id. at 24 (Elliot, J., concurring).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Ashland, 782 F.2d at 157.
91. Id. at 159.
92. See Waldschmidt v. CBS, Inc., 14 B.R. 309, 314 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1981).
93. Ashland, 782 F.2d at 159. See In re Yonkers Hamilton Sanitarium, Inc., 34 B.R. 385, 386
(Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1982).
94. Lee, 739 F.2d at 875.
95. Ashland, 782 F.2d at 158.
96. Id.
97. Lee, 739 F.2d at 875. For example, two parties could enter into a contract involving certain
goods. At a later point in time, the same two parties could enter into another contract involving the
same goods, but it would not be considered the same transaction.
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and delivered prior to B&L's bankruptcy petition. 9" After B&L's petition,
Ashland received subsequent oil deliveries for which it owed payments
to B&L. 9 As the Ashland court observed, "the obligations are easily
separable and independently determinable."' It is illogical to conclude
that these purchases arose out of the same transaction. "i' In like manner,
transactions between Ashland and B&L should be considered separate.
The withholding of payments due to B&L from Ashland does not meet
the requirements of a proper recoupment because the transactions are
different. 02
C. Discussion and Analysis of the Court's Equitable Consideration
The Ashland court reiterates the justification espoused in Lee v. Schwei-
ker for invoking the recoupment doctrine: °3 "The justification for the
recoupment doctrine is that where the creditor's claim against the debtor
arises from the same transaction as the debtor's claim, it is essentially a
defense to the debtor's claim against the creditor rather than a mutual
obligation, and application of the limitations on setoff in bankruptcy
would be inequitable.""0 This justification, however, is unpersuasive in
the Ashland case. The Ashland court found that "Ashland's overpayment
is not 'essentially a defense' to B&L's current claims for payment on
post-bankruptcy deliveries. " '5 Furthermore, to support this justification,
the Lee court cited In re Monongahela Rye Liquors, " which noted that
the right to recoupment did not arise from the setoff provisions of former
Section 68.1°7 However, in Monongahela Rye Liquors the bankruptcy
trustee attempted to recoup against the claim of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania in order to avoid the bar of sovereign immunity.'08 There
98. Ashland, 782 F.2d at 156.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 158.
101. In another bankruptcy case, Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. Fidelity and Deposit Co.
of Maryland, 63 B.R. 18 (Bankr. E. D. Pa. 1986), decided after Ashland, but involving a similar
issue, the court stated that "... it does not necessarily follow that every contract contemplates only
one series of transactions." Id. at 22. In Westinghouse, pursuant to a previous contract, the West-
inghouse Corp. withheld commissions due the Enviro-Scope Corp. subsequent to Enviro-Scope's
initiation of Chapter I I proceedings. Id. at 19. The commissions were withheld in payment for
goods purchased from Westinghouse by Enviro-Scope. Id. at 20. The court held that the creditor's
(Westinghouse) obligation to pay the commission arose from a different transaction than did the
debtor's (Enviro-Scope) obligation to pay for goods purchased directly from the creditors. Id. at 22.
The creditor's retention of commissions owed to the debtor was held to be an improper setoff, rather
than a recoupment. Id.
102. Instead, Ashland's actions constitute an improper setoff in violation of the automatic stay
because the condition of mutuality of parties cannot be satisfied.
103. Ashland, 782 F.2d at 157.
104. Lee, 739 F.2d at 875.
105. Ashland, 782 F.2d at 158.
106. In re Monongahela Rye Liquors, 141 F.2d 864, 869 (3d Cir. 1944).
107. 11 U.S.C. §68 (1978).
108. In re Monongahela Rye Liquors, 141 F.2d at 869.
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was no problem of preferential distribution to a creditor. To say that it
would be inequitable to apply 11 U.S.C. § 553's limitations on setoff to
recoupment is to fail to understand that Congress has carved out a limited
exception to the rule of equal distribution by allowing setoff in the first
place. 09
Two of the primary goals of the bankruptcy laws are: 1) to permit the
debtor the broadest possible relief in the bankruptcy court,"1 and 2) to
distribute any assets of the debtor equally among the creditors. "' To insure
that these policies are met, the bankruptcy laws established the rule that
an unsecured creditor's claim which arises prior to the debtor's bankruptcy
petition cannot be used to recoup a claim of the assignee, receiver, or
bankruptcy trustee brought against the unsecured creditor. 112 Since a debtor-
in-possession essentially performs the same role as a trustee, ' 13 the rule
also applies to creditors' claims arising before the debtor-in-possession
was created by the debtor filing for bankruptcy."'4 Ashland's claims for
overpayment arose before B&L filed for bankruptcy and became a debtor-
in-possession. "5 Thus, in the instant case, the rule applies to B&L Oil
Co.
To allow Ashland to recoup its prepetition overpayment against the
post-bankruptcy claim of the debtor-in-possession (B&L), may enable
Ashland to receive full payment of its claim." 6 Payment of all or part of
Ashland's claim would be a preference'.' over other unsecured creditors
who, unless given special treatment under the Bankruptcy Code, would
typically be paid less than 100% on their claim. The goal of equal dis-
tribution among general creditors is thereby thwarted as is the policy of
allowing the debtor, B&L, the broadest possible relief.
Finally, the Ashland court is concerned that if Ashland is unable to
recoup the overpayments made to B&L, B&L's other creditors would
receive a windfall." ' According to the court, this is a classic case of
109. California Canners and Growers, 62 B.R. at 23. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 91 § 553.02
(15th ed. 1985).
110. See United States v. Wall (In re Wall), 60 B.R. 512, 514 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1986); see also,
H.R. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 309 (1977); S.R. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 21 reprinted
in 1978, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5807, 6266.
The basic relief of bankruptcy is what is known as a "fresh start"-the ability of the debtor to
start over. This "fresh start" allows the debtor to "discharge" his debts and to be free from the
obligations they impose. I I U.S.C. § 727 (1978).
111. 4 COLLIER ON BANKR. § 547.03 (15th ed. 1985).
112. Quittner v. Los Angeles Steel Casting Co., 202 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1953).
113. See II U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1978).
114. See II U.S.C. §§ 101(12), 1101(i) (1978).
115. Ashland, 782 F.2d at 156.
116. Recoupment, however, does not allow affirmative assertion of the recouping party's claim
above the amount of the opposing party's claim. Frederick v. United States, 386 F.2d 481, 487 (5th
Cir. 1967).
117. Payment by B&L of any of Ashland's claim would be a preference because it meets the
conditions set forth in § 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. See supra note 15.
118. Ashland, 782 F.2d at 159.
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unjust enrichment." 9 In continuing its contract with Ashland, B&L, as
the debtor-in-possession, was acting on behalf of all B&L's creditors.
By granting Ashland's claim, the court interfered with the ratable distri-
bution of assets among the other unsecured creditors."'2 It seems clearly
unfair to B&L's other creditors to allow recoupment in this situation
solely because of the fortuitous and debatable circumstances that Ash-
land's claim arose from the "same transaction" rather than separate trans-
actions. Thus, the court's decision cannot be maintained on equitable
grounds.
V. CONCLUSION
Setoff and recoupment are exceptions to the basic rule in bankruptcy
that the debtor's estate is distributed equally among unsecured creditors.
While Congress restricted the use of setoff statutorily in the Bankruptcy
Code, the courts imposed limitations on the recoupment doctrine. The
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit expanded the doctrine of recoup-
ment in Ashland by allowing a creditor to recoup overpayments that did
not arise out of the same transaction, and were not essentially a defense
to the debtor's claim. This decision failed to uphold one of the primary
goals of the bankruptcy laws-ratable distribution of the debtor's estate
among all unsecured creditors.
TONYA NOONAN HERRING
119. Id. (Although this argument is appealing, it is unclear how this situation differs from many
of the typical situations presented in bankruptcy where a debtor has received the benefit of a contract
or a loan but is discharged from his obligations thereunder.) See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
63 B.R. at 21.
120. See Republic Supply Co. v. Richfield Oil Co., 59 F.2d 35, 37 (9th Cir. 1931).
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